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FOREWORD
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to
control damage from debris in the Shuttle operational
environment and to make the control measures a part of routine
launch flows. These measures include engineering surveillance
during vehicle processing and closeout operations, facility
and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and
photographic analysis of mission events.
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch,
on-orbit, and landing provide significant data in verifying
proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In addi-
tion to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Photo/Video Analysis,
reports from Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space Flight
Center, and Rockwell International - Downey are also included
in this document to provide an integrated assessment of the
mission.
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Shuttle Mission STS-50 was launched at
1
12:12 p,mo local 6/25/92
COLOR PHO FOGRAPH

1.0 Summmary
The pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle
vehicle was conducted on 24 June 1992. The detailed walkdown
of Launch Pad 39A and MLP-3 also included the primary flight
elements OV-102 Columbia (12th flight), ET-50 (LWT 43), and
BI-051 SRB's. There were no vehicle or facility anomalies.
The vehicle was cryoloaded for flight on 25 June 1992. There
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 viola-
tions. There were no ice or frost conditions outside of the
established data base. The External Tank TPS acreage was
covered by light condensate. The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical leak
sensor detected no significant hydrogen during the cryoload. A
I0" x 0.25" crack occurred in the forward surface of the -Y
ET/SRB vertical strut cable tray near the longeron closeout
interface. The crack exhibited no offset and contained no
ice/frost. The crack occurred in an area where the stress
relief cut had been eliminated by design at the factory. Based
on previous experience with a TPS crack in this location, the
condition was approved for flight.
A debris inspection of Pad 39A was performed after launch.
One FRSI plug from the Orbiter base heat shield was the only
flight hardware found. Launch damage to the holddown posts was
minimal. EPON shim material on the south holddown posts was
intact, but debonded. No frangible nut/ordnance fragments were
found. The GH2 vent line had latched properly. Damage to the
facility overall was minimal.
A total of 127 film and video items were analyzed as part of
the launch and landing data review. No major vehicle damage or
lost flight hardware was observed that would have affected the
mission. A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #4. The stud remained
fully extended as the aft skirt ascended. The stud pulled off
a piece of the EPON shim, "twanged" briefly after clearing the
stud hole, and dropped into the holddown post. No ordnance
debris fell from any of the HDP DCS/stud holes. Orbiter
performance, landing gear extension, wheel touchdown, and
vehicle rollout after landing were normal.
OV-102 carried three ET/ORB umbilical cameras. Imagery from
these cameras revealed approximately 60 percent of the LH
bipod ramp closeout was missing to a depth that exposed part
of the spindle housing along with some of the intertank
acreage foam at the leading edge of the ramp (26" x i0" total
damage site). Debris damage to Orbiter TPS was greater than
average, including a 9"x4.5"x0.5" damage site on the lower
surface, and may have been caused by the loss of the ET foam.
Loss of the bipod ramp closeout could be the result of TPS
material failure on the ET intertank acreage due to inadequate
venting. This event appeared similar to the occurrence on
STS-7. IFA STS-50-I-01 was taken, and as a result, additional
vent holes were drilled around the ET-48 (STS-46), ET-45
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(STS-47), and ET-49 (STS-53) bipod ramp closeouts. The vent
holes relieve any possible trapped gas pockets in foam-over-
foam ET intertank TPS. In addition, the RH jack pad closeout
and some adjacent foam was missing (6 inch diameter divot).
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after
retrieval. The frustums exhibited a total of 41 debonds over
fasteners. The HDP #4 stud hole was broached due to a stud
hang-up at lift off as observed in the launch films. A 6"x3"
piece of the EPON shim material had been pulled off by the
stud. A small piece of the HDP #3 EPON shim was missing prior
to water impact (sooted substrate) . All Debris Containment
System (DCS) plungers were seated properly. This was the
eighth flight utilizing the optimized link.
A detailed post landing inspection of OV-102 (Columbia) was
conducted on 9 July 1992 (10th landing at KSC). The Orbiter
TPS sustained a total of 184 hits, of which 45 had a major
dimension of one inch or greater. The Orbiter lower surface
had a total of 141 hits, of which 28 had a major dimension of
one inch or greater. Based on these numbers and comparison to
statistics from previous missions of similar configuration,
the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits was greater than
average and the number of hits one inch or larger was much
higher than average. The most significant tile damage measured
9.0" x 4.5" x 0.5", spanned three tiles, and was located
approximately 3 feet outboard of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical.
An expended detonator/electrical connector from the umbilical
separation system fell to the runway when the RH (L02) ET door
was opened. The EO-2 and EO-3 separation ordnance device
plungers appeared to have functioned properly. Examination of
the windows revealed on-orbit debris impacts to windows #2, 3,
4, 6, and 8. The depth of the impacts ranged from 0.0029 to
0.0055 inches, exceeding the acceptance criteria of 0.0006
inches. The depth of the impact site on window #4 was not
measured but was estimated to be greater than 0.004 inches.
A variety of residuals were present in the Orbiter window
samples and originated from sources such as Orbiter TPS,
Orbiter window polishing compound, SRB BSM exhaust residue,
natural landing site products, organics, and paint. Samples
from tile damage sites indicated primarily Orbiter thermal
protection system (TPS) materials. The damage site on the
vertical stabilizer revealed traces of a structural compound
of unknown origin. However this material is similar to that
used on this and other types of spacecraft hardware as a
structural coating material. These data do not indicate a
single source of damaging debris as all of the other materials
have been previously documented in post-landing samples.
A total of 12 Post Launch Anomalies, including three IFA
candidates, were observed during this mission assessment.
2.0 PRE-I_UNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle
was conducted on 24 June 1992 from 1345 - 1500 hours. The
detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39A and MLP-3 also included the
primary flight elements OV-102 Columbia (12th flight), ET-50
(LWT 43), and BI-051 SRB's. Documentary photographs were taken
of facility anomalies, potential sources of vehicle damaging
debris, and vehicle configuration changes.
Due to the continued concern over potential hydrogen leakage
from the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical interface area during cryoload/
launch, temporary hydrogen leak detectors LD54 and LD55 were
installed at the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical until a permanent sensor
could be designed and installed. The tygon tubes are intended
to remain in place during cryogenic loading and be removed by
the Ice Team during the T-3 hour hold.
There were no significant vehicle anomalies. Prior to the S0007
countdown, the External Tank had sustained F.O.D. damage in two
places. Damaged foam, measuring 8.5" x 5.8" x 3.4" max, on the
-Y (LH) thrust strut/longeron (knuckle) closeout was repaired
with BX-250 (PR-ET-50-TS-0021) . No substrate damage occurred.
The object which had been dropped from an upper level and
caused the damage had not been found.
High pressure metal tubing, approximately 2.5 feet long by 0.25
inches in diameter, fell from an undetermined location and
damaged Super Light Ablator (SLA) on the crossbeam cable tray
near the LO2 feedline. The damaged area, measuring 0.9" x 0.7"
x 0.5" deep, was repaired with SLA Type 1 (PR-ET-50-TS-0022).
The tubing had apparently also damaged two Orbiter tiles. SLA
in an adjacent area was damaged by personnel repairing the
Orbiter tiles. This area of damage was determined to be accept-
able for launch per drawing (PR-ET-50-TS-0023) . PER's were
written on these two incidents.
A sheared bolt (no bolt head) was present in the kick plate on
the east side of the north raised deck area. A bolt was missing
from the MLP deck plate electrical box feedthrough east of the
RH SRB. These discrepancies were corrected real-time by Pad
Operations and no items were entered in S0007, Appendix K.
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Bipod jack pad closeouts prior to cryogenic fuel loading
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LH2 ET/ORB umbilical, including aft pyrotechnic canister
closeout and 17-inch flapper valve actuator access port foam
plug closeout, prior to cryogenic fuel loading.
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3.0 LAUNCH
STS-50 was launched at 25:16:12:23 GMT (12:12:23 p.m. local) on
25 June 1992.
3 .1 ICE/FROST INSPECTION
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was
performed on 25 June 1992 from 0645 to 0840 hours during the
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 violations.
There were no conditions outside of the established data base.
Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection were:
Temperature:
Relative Humidity:
Wind Speed:
Wind Direction:
76.9 F
87.2 %
6.7 Knots
161 Degrees
The portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning
radiometer was utilized to obtain surface temperature measure-
ments for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle, as
shown in Figures 1 and 2.
3.2 ORBITER
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed with the
exception of a 3-inch piece of cloth tape on a lower surface
tile near the LH wing tip. The FlU, F3U, and all LH FRCS
thruster paper covers were wet from recent rain, but intact.
The water spray boiler plugs were intact. Light frost was
present at the SSME #I and #2 heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces.
Condensate was present on all SSME heat shields and on base
heat shield tiles. An infrared scan revealed no unusual
temperature gradients on the base heat shield or engine mounted
heat shields. No unusual vapors originated from inside the SSME
nozzles.
3.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. The K5NA
closeouts of the aft booster stiffener ring splice plates were
intact. The STI portable infrared scanner recorded RH and LH
SRB case surface temperatures between 73 and 78 degrees F. In
comparison, temperatures measured by the hand-held Cyclops
radiometer ranged from 74 to 80 degrees F and the GEI (Ground
Environment Instrumentation) measured temperatures that ranged
from 77 to 82 degrees F. All measured temperatures were above
the 34 degrees F minimum requirement. The predicted Propellant
Mean Bulk Temperature (PMBT) supplied by MTI was 78 degrees F,
which was within the required range of 44-86 degrees F.
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3.4 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run
from 0415 to 1200 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 3.
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation
on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload.
There was very light condensate, but no ice/frost accumulation,
on the L02 tank ogive and barrel sections. There were no TPS
anomalies. The tumble valve cover was intact. The pressuriza-
tion line and support ramps were in nominal configuration. The
portable STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 73
degrees F on the ogive and 72 degrees Fahrenheit on the barrel
section. In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured
temperatures that averaged 74 degrees F on the ogive and 71
degrees F on the barrel, while SURFICE predicted temperatures
of 70 degrees F on the ogive and 66 degrees F on the barrel.
The intertank TPS acreage was dry. Frost spots were present in
the stringer valleys at both the LH2 and L02 tank-to-intertank
flanges. No unusual vapors or ice formations were present on
the ET umbilical carrier plate. Both the portable STI and the
Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures that averaged 74
degrees F _.
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light condensate,
but no ice or frost, was present on the acreage and aft dome.
The portable STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 69
degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 68 degrees F on the lower
LH2 tank. In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured
temperatures that averaged 69 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank
and 70 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank; SURFICE predicted
temperatures of 57 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 65
degrees F on the lower LH2 tank.
There were no anomalies on the bipods, bipod jack pad
closeouts, PAL ramp, cable tray/press line ice/frost ramps,
longerons, thrust struts, manhole covers, or aft dome apex.
Some ice/frost was present in the ET/SRB cable tray-to-upper
strut fairing expansion joints. Ice/frost covered the lower EB
fittings outboard to the strut pin hole with condensate on the
rest of the fitting. The struts were dry. A i0" x 0.25" crack
occurred in the forward surface of the -Y ET/SRB cable tray
near the longeron closeout interface. There was no offset and
no ice/frost in the crack. The condition was accepted for
launch.
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline
bellows and support brackets.
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There were no TPS anomalies on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. The
purge barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding
positive purge pressure. There were no accumulations of
ice/frost on the acreage areas of the umbilical. Formation of
ice/frost on the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge
vents was typical. Normal venting of nitrogen purge gas had
occurred during tanking, stable replenish, and launch.
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both
burst disks was typical. The LH2 feedline bellows were wet with
condensate.
Amounts of ice/frost on the top, outboard, and inboard sides of
the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier were less than usual.
Typical ice/frost fingers had formed on the pyro canister and
plate gap purge vents. Ice/frost had also formed on the aft
pyrotechnic canister bondline. Thin foam exists in this area
due to an incorrect mold manufacture. The amount and location
of the ice/frost was acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303
criteria. Normal venting of helium purge gas had occurred
during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. There were no
unusual vapors emanating from the umbilicals nor any evidence
of cryogenic drips. No ice or frost had formed on the cable
tray vent hole or on the 17-inch flapper valve actuator access
port foam plug.
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing was in proper
position prior to removal. The tubing was successfully removed
from the vehicle, but released prematurely at the upper strut
fairing attach point due to entanglement of the pull cord.
There was no flight hardware contact or TPS damage.
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations/anomalies consisted
of five OTV recorded items:
Anomaly 001 and PR-ET-50-TS-0025 documented a I0" x 0.25" crack
on the forward side of the -Y ET/SRB vertical strut/cable tray.
The crack occurred in an area where the stress relief cut had
been eliminated by design at the factory. Based on previous
experience with a TPS crack in this location, the condition was
approved for flight.
Anomaly 002 recorded ice/frost spots in the intertank stringer
valleys at both the LH2 and LO2 tank-to-intertank flanges in
the -Y-Z quadrant. The ice/frost was acceptable per NSTS-08303.
Anomaly 003 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations
in the L02 feedline bellows and support brackets. These ice and
frost formations were acceptable per NSTS-08303.
Anomaly 004 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations
on the L02 umbilical purge vents and LH2 umbilical purge vents,
purge barrier (baggie), and LH2 recirculation line bellows. The
ice/frost formations were acceptable per NSTS-08303.
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Anomaly 005 (documentation only) recorded 4 areas of froth on
the LH2 aft dome -Z manhole cover. The presence of froth was
acceptable per NSTS-08303.
3.5 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and
properly configured for launch. There was no debris on the MLP
deck or in the SRB holddown post areas with the exception of a
loose electrical conduit cap on the east side of the SSME flame
exhaust hole.
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-0
umbilicals, though typical accumulations of ice/frost were
present on the cryogenic lines and purge shrouds. There was
also no apparent leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent line or GUCP.
The GH2 vent line modification prevented ice from forming, but
some ice/frost, which was expected, had accumulated on the GUCP
legs and on the uninsulated parts of the umbilical carrier
plate.
Visual and infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no
leakage. No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the
GOX vent hood was retracted. No icicles had formed on the GOX
vent ducts.
13

 USA
OV-102 Columbia, ET-50 (LWT 43) , and BI051 SRB' s
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The LH forward RCS thruster paper covers were wet, but intact
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\Overall view of Shuttle Main Engines. Light frost was present
on the SSME #i and #2 heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces. All
three SSME engine mounted heatshields and some base heat shield
tiles were wet with condensate.
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Very light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, were
present on the ET LO2 and LH2 tank TPS acreage.
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LH (-Y) bipod ramp closeout after cryogenic fuel loading. There
were no visual indications to account for the loss of 60
percent of the ramp closeout and a portion of the intertank
acreage TPS sometime during flight.
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RH (+Y) bipod jack pad closeout after cryogenic fuel loading.
There was no ice/frost accumulation on the closeout or bond
line and no sign of debond. However, ET separation photography
revealed the loss of the closeout sometime during flight.
19
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Typical amounts of crusty ice/frost had formed in the
L02 feedline lower bellows
20

BX-250 repair to an F.O.D. damage site on the LH (-Y) thrust
strut to longeron (knuckle) closeout exhibited no ice or frost
accumulations after cryogenic fuel loading.
21
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A crack 10 inches long appeared in the -Y vertical strut cable
tray forward facing surface near the tank acreage interface. A
stress relief cut in the TPS to allow for structural movement
had been deleted by design.
22
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The i/4-inch wide crack exhibited no offset and there was no
ice or frost in the crack. The condition was accepted for
launch.
23
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Ice/frost formations on the inboard side of the umbilical/
purge barrier, the lower plate gap purge vent, and in the LH2
recirculation line bellows were typical. Ice/frost accumulated
on the thin foam and bondline around the aft pyro canister
24
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A loose electrical conduit cap on the east side of the
SSME flame exhaust hole was removed
25
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4.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
The post launch inspection of the MLP, FSS and Pad acreage was
conducted on 25 June 1992 from Launch + 2 to 4 1/2 hours. No
flight hardware or TPS materials associated with this mission
were found with the exception of one FRSI plug (possibly from
the Orbiter base heat shield).
Five pieces of HDP shim material were found approximately 100
feet east of the pad surface in the acreage area. One side of
one piece was coated with primer. None appeared to be from this
launch.
South SRB holddown post erosion was typical. EPON shim material
was intact on all south holddown posts. However, the sidewall
material was partially debonded and showed a considerable
number of voids. There was no visual indication of a stud
hang-up on any of the south holddown posts. No ordnance
fragments were found in the south HDP stud holes. All of the
north HDP doghouse blast covers were in the closed position and
exhibited greater than normal erosion. HDP #4 blast cover had
an approximately 12 inch long crack along the southeast ridge.
Pieces of material were missing from corners of HDP #3, #7,
and #8 blast covers. The SRB aft skirt purge lines were in
place but slightly damaged. The SRB T-0 umbilicals exhibited
minor damage including deformation of the sacrificial connector
savers.
The GOX vent arm, OAA, and TSM's showed the usual minor amount
of damage. The GH2 vent line latched on the eighth tooth.
There were no loose cables, but the north latch appeared to
have contacted the north saddle stabilizer. The damage from
this contact was minimal and has occurred on previous launches.
Damage to the facility included:
I. A lighting fixture found on the west edge of the
FSS 95' level. The fixture appeared to have originated
from the east side of the elevator enclosure.
2. Two damaged electrical junction box doors on the 95 and
175 foot levels of the FSS.
3. Two detached FSS 175 and 235 level signs were found on
the FSS.
4. Loose piece of sheet metal (2' x 3') on the roof of the
RSS.
5. Five pieces of facility foam were found on the RSS 215
foot level.
6. Miscellaneous, typical facility hardware were found.
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The ablative material at the bottom of the SRB flame deflector
was damaged more than usual. Many broken pieces of this
material were blown to the north by the SRB exhaust plume
causing damage to the perimeter fence, two lighting fixtures,
and one wood utility pole.
All seven emergency egress slidewire baskets were secured on
the FSS 195 foot level and sustained no launch damage.
An inspection of the beach from UCS-9 to the Titan complex, the
beach road, the railroad tracks, and the water areas around the
pad and under the flight path was canceled due to inclement
weather from the tropical depression.
MLP-3 was configured with overpressure sensors at the top of
both TSM's, at the bottom of both SRB exhaust holes, and at the
bottom of the SSME exhaust hole. All sensor readings were
consistent with previous launches and within nominal limits.
Patrick AFB and MILA radars were configured in a mode for
increased sensitivity for the purpose of observing any debris
falling from the vehicle during ascent but after SRB separation
(due to the masking effect of the SRB exhaust plume). Most of
the signal registrations were very weak and often barely detec-
table, which generally compares with the types of particles
detected on previous Shuttle flights. A total of 49 particles
were imaged in the T+145.5 to 360.0 second time period.
Twenty-five of the particles were imaged by only one radar, 21
particles were imaged by two radars, and 3 particles were
imaged by all three radars. Compared to STS-49, both the number
of detected particles and the total number of radar detections
were noticeably lower.
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section 9.
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Plume erosion of the south SRB holddown posts was typical. EPON
shim material was intact, but debonded along the sidewalls.
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The SRB T-O umbilicals sustained minor damage
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5.0 FILM REVIEWAND PROBLEM REPORTS
Post Launch Anomalies observed in the Film Review were
presented to the Mission Management Team, Shuttle managers, and
vehicle systems engineers. These anomalies are listed in
Section 9.
5.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO S_Y
A total of 106 film and video data items, which included
thirty-seven videos, forty-six 16mm films, nineteen 35mm films,
and four 70mm films, were reviewed starting on launch day.
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed
that would have affected the mission.
SSME ignition, Mach diamond formation, and gimbal profile
appeared normal. Free burning hydrogen drifted upward to the
OMS pods and north under the body flap (RSS STI, C/S-2 STI, OTV
051, 063, 070). No discolorations or unusual streaks were
visible in the Mach diamonds or exhaust plumes (E-2, 3, 19,
20) .
Fore-aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the
centerline area between the SSME cluster occurred during the
early stages of SSME ignition (E-19, 20, 76). The motion was
similar to that observed on previous launches.
SSME ignition caused numerous pieces of ice/frost to fall from
the ET/0rbiter umbilicals. No damage to Orbiter tiles or ET TPS
was visible. There were no unusual vapors or cryogenic drips
from the ET/ORB umbilicals during tanking, stable replenish,
ignition, or liftoff (0TV 009, 054, 056, 063, 064, E-4) .
SSME ignition vibration and acoustics caused the loss of tile
surface coating material from eight places on the base heat
shield (E-6, 18, 19, 23, 24) and one place on the LH OMS pod
base heat shield (E-19).
An orange GSE tile shim originated near the RIA thruster and
fell aft during SSME ignition (E-19, frame 2950).
Light frost was present in the ET GOX vent louvers. There was
no TPS damage to the ET nosecone, footprint, or fairing (OTV
060, 061). ET "twang" of approximately 32 inches was typical
(E-79). The ET nosecone/pressure spike returned to the 13 inch
mark at T-0.
The Orbiter LH2 and LO2 T-0 umbilicals disconnected and
retracted properly (OTV 049, 063). A small rectangular object,
possibly a metal parts tag, fell from the LO2 T-0 umbilical
during SSME ignition. The object did not contact flight
hardware (E-17) . Separation of the GUCP from the External Tank
3O
was nominal (OTV 004). The GH2 vent line retracted normally and
latched with no rebound. There was no excessive slack in the
static retract lanyard (E-33, 41, 42, 48, 50).
A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #4 (E-7, 10). The stud remained
fully extended as the aft skirt ascended. The stud pulled off a
6"x3" piece of the EPON shim, "twanged" briefly after clearing
the stud hole, and dropped into the holddown post. No ordnance
debris fell from any of the HDP DCS/stud holes.
A 2"xl" object, most likely a piece of the EPON shim, fell from
the HDP #3 aft skirt foot as the vehicle lifted off (E-10) .
Loss of the shim material is consistent with findings from the
SRB Post Flight Inspection.
HDP #I and #5 shoe rotation appeared typical. A 3-inch long
piece of dark debris, possibly a K5NA trimming or piece of
tape, first appeared from the area behind the DCS housing at
T-0 and fell into the exhaust hole (EXI, EX4) . Although the -Z
sides released first, separation of the SRB T-0 umbilicals from
the aft skirts was nominal (EX2, EX3) .
A semi-rigid object, possibly a piece of SRB thermal curtain
tape or HDP firing line tape, first appeared in the RH SRB
exhaust hole near HDP #4, passed between camera E-15 and the
center rainbird, and moved north away from the vehicle (E-l, 4,
15). A bright object was visible near the RH SRB plume in film
item E-222 at 16:12:25.381 GMT and may be the large, flexible
object. Debris (a long, thin flexible piece and two bright
objects) appeared near the RH aft booster shortly after liftoff
and moved away from the vehicle. The debris appeared to
originate near the HDP #4 area (E-52) .
Film item E-60 confirmed that water flowed properly from all
MLP rainbirds.
A 15-20 inch long piece of thermal curtain tape was loose under
the aft skirt near HDP #2 at liftoff (E-l, 2, 5, 8, 9, 31,
212).
Clusters of particles falling aft of the Orbiter after comple-
tion of the roll maneuver were traced to the forward RCS
thrusters and were pieces of RCS paper covers. Other pieces of
RCS paper covers were visible passing over the Orbiter wings
(E-213) .
Orange flashes occurred in the SSME plume during ascent at
16:12:53.167 and 16:12:54.636 GMT (E-222).
Movement of the body flap was visible (E-220) .
Tracker coverage was hindered due to cloud coverage.
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ET aft dome charring, plume recirculation, and SRB separation
appeared normal. (TV-13) .
Frustum separation from the forward skirts, parachute deploy-
ment and reefing appeared normal. Nozzle severance debris,
which was typical, caused some small tears/damage to the
parachutes. Water splashdown was not visible (E-301, 302).
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A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #7. The stud remained fully
extended as the aft skirt ascended. The stud pulled off a 6"x3"
piece of the EPON shim (arrow) , "twanged" briefly after
clearing the stud hole, and dropped into the holddown post.
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A semi-rigid object, possibly a piece of SRB thermal curtain
tape or HDP firing line tape, first appeared in the RH SRB
exhaust hole near HDP #4, passed between camera E-15 and the
center rainbird, and moved north away from the vehicle.
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5.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUPJMARY
Separation views of the LH Solid Rocket Booster and External
Tank were obtained from one 35mm and two 16mm ET/ORB umbilical
cameras. Shortly after ET separation, sunlight saturated the
FOV on all three cameras. In addition, there were eighty-nine
70mm still views taken by the flight crew. The first 65 frames
were taken while the window UV filter was still mounted in
window #8 causing the frames to be underexposed.
Separation of the LH SRB from the ET, and separation of the ET
from the Orbiter, appeared nominal.
Approximately 60 percent of the LH bipod ramp closeout was
missing to a depth that exposed part of the spindle housing
along with some of the intertank acreage foam at the leading
edge of the ramp (26" x I0" total damage site). Debris damage
to Orbiter TPS was subsequently found to be greater than
average, including a 9"x4.5"x0.5" damage site on the lower
surface, and may have been caused by the loss of the ET foam.
Loss of the bipod ramp closeout could be the result of TPS
material failure on the ET intertank acreage due to inadequate
venting. This event appeared similar to the occurrence on STS-
7.
IFA STS-50-I-01 was taken, and as a result, additional vent
holes were drilled around the ET-48 (STS-46), ET-45 (STS-47),
and ET-49 (STS-53) bipod ramp closeouts. The vent holes relieve
any possible trapped gas pockets in foam-over-foam ET intertank
TPS.
The RH jack pad closeout and some adjacent foam was missing (6
inch diameter divot). The LH jack pad closeout was intact.
Numerous areas of TPS erosion and small divots occurred on the
thrust strut flange closeouts, the LO2 feedline flange
closeouts, six of the pressurization line ramps, and two of the
cable tray ice/frost ramps. A 7-inch diameter divot occurred on
the inboard side of the L02 feedline support bracket at
XT-1377.
Small divots and TPS erosion occurred on the LH2 ET/ORB umbili-
cal support bracket and cable tray. No TPS damage occurred on
the umbilical though frozen hydrogen was visible on the flapper
valve and along the seal.
Small divots and TPS erosion occurred on the LO2 ET/ORB umbili-
cal cable tray (horizontal section). Six divots, including one
that spanned the entire width of the cable tray, were present
on the +Z side of the vertical section.
Charring and erosion of the -Y vertical strut aft surface and
"popcorning" of the aft dome NCFI were typical.
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There were no apparent anomalies on the L02 tank, LH2 tank, and
aft dome TPS acreage. The BSM burn scars were typical. The
nosecone, intertank access door, GH2 umbilical carrier plate,
ET/SRB forward attach points, and RSS antennae were in nominal
configuration.
5.3 LANDING FILMANDVIDEO S_m_tY
A total of seventeen film and video data items, which included
seven videos, six 16mm high speed films, and four 35mm large
format films, were reviewed.
Orbiter performance in the Heading Alignment Circle (HAC) and
final approach appeared nominal. Main landing gear deployment
and touchdown was normal. Nose rotation and touchdown of the
nose landing gear was smooth. First use of the drag chute for a
KSC landing appeared normal. No vehicle or major tile damage
was visible in these views.
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LH2 ET/ORB umbilical separation camera with 5mm lens showed no
vehicle damage or loss of flight hardware that would have been
a safety of flight concern. Separation of the LH SRB from the
External Tank was nominal..
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LH2 ET/ORB umbilical separation camera with 10mm lens showed
typical erosion and charring of TPS on the aft surfaces of the
umbilical cable tray and -Y vertical strut. Plume recirculation
and aft dome heating caused the usual charring and "popcorning"
of the NCFI foam. Small divots and TPS erosion occurred on the
LH2 ET/ORB umbilical support bracket and cable tray. No TPS
damage occurred at the umbilical interface though frozen
hydrogen was visible on the flapper valve and along the seal.
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Numerous areas of TPS erosion and small divots occurred on the
LO2 feedline support bracket and flange closeout, pressuriza-
tion line ramp, and ET/SRB cable tray closeout. Six divots,
including one that spanned the entire width of the cable tray,
were present on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical.
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Numerous areas of TPS erosion and small divots occurred on the
thrust strut flange closeout, the cable tray ramp, the press
line ramps, and the L02 feedline flange closeouts and support
bracket .

A 26"xi0" area of LH bipod ramp closeout, along with a portion
of the intertank TPS acreage, was missing. In addition, the RH
bipod jack pad closeout was missing. There were numerous divots
and areas of missing TPS on the LO2 feedline flange closeouts,
support bracket at XT-1377, and pressurization line ramps.
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6.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and
debris sources at CCAFS Hangar AF on 27 June 1992 from 0930 to
1200 hours. From a debris standpoint, both SRB's were in
excellent condition.
6.1 RH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had 26 MSA-2 debonds over
fasteners (Figure 4). Minor localized blistering of the Hypalon
paint had occurred along the 395 ring. All BSM aero heatshield
covers were locked in the fully opened position.
The RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS
(Figure 5). The -Z RSS antenna was undamaged. Ablator on the
+Z RSS antenna cover was significantly eroded, which may have
been caused by contact with the tow rope. The top two layers on
the phenolic base plate were missing/delaminated. Minor
blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred on the systems tunnel
cover. No pins were missing from the frustum severance ring.
The forward separation bolt and electrical cables appeared to
have separated cleanly.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were
generally in good condition. Minor trailing edge damage to the
FJPS and the GEI cork runs were attributed to debris resulting
from severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB
aft struts, ETA ring, IEA, and IEA covers appeared undamaged.
No TPS was missing from the ET/SRB upper strut fairing. All
three aft booster stiffener rings sustained water impact
damage. The aft booster stiffener ring splice plate closeouts
were intact and no K5NA material was missing.
The phenolic material on the kick ring had delaminated. Eight
K5NA protective domes were lost from bolt heads on the aft side
of the kick ring prior to water impact (sooted substrate) . The
aft skirt acreage TPS generally was in good condition. Two TPS
divots (2.5"xi", 3"xi.25") were present on the +Y axis of the
aft skirt near the aft ring (XB-1926) . Since sooting/charring
was evident on the edges of the divots, the surrounding
material was removed for further analysis. K5NA was missing
from all aft BSM nozzles (Figure 6).
The HDP #4 stud hole was broached due to a stud hang-up at lift
off as observed in the launch films. A 6"x3" piece of the EPON
shim material had been pulled off by the stud. A small piece of
the HDP #3 EPON shim was missing prior to water impact (sooted/
charred substrate) . All Debris Containment System (DCS)
plungers were seated properly. This was the eighth flight
utilizing the optimized link.
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%The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had 26 MSA-2 debonds over
fasteners. Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint had occurred
along the 395 ring. The BSM aero heat shield covers were locked
in the fully opened position.
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The RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Minor
blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred in localized areas.
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Ablator on the +Z RSS antenna cover was significantly eroded,
but the clean edges indicated the loss of material had been
caused by contact with the tow rope.
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The top two layers of the +Z RSS antenna
phenolic base plate were missing/delaminated
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Post flight condition of the RH aft booster. The aft skirt
acreage TPS was sooted but in good condition. The ET/SRB aft
struts, ETA ring, and IEA appeared undamaged. All three aft
booster stiffener rings sustained water impact damage.
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The HDP #4 stud hole was broached due to a stud hang-up at lift
off. A 6"x3" piece of the EPON shim material had been pulled
off by the stud.
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6.2 LH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The LH frustum had 15 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners and was
missing MSA-2 (2.5"xi.5" maximum) from one location near the -Z
axis. There was minor localized blistering of the Hypalon paint
(Figure 7). The BSM aero heatshield covers were locked in the
fully opened position. However, two RH cover attach rings had
been bent at the hinge by parachute riser entanglement.
The LH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. The
phenolic plates on both RSS antennae were intact. However, most
of the ablator on the +Z antenna cover was lost at water impact
(clean substrate) and was not a debris concern (Figure 8). The
forward separation bolt and electrical cables appeared to have
separated cleanly. No pins were missing from the frustum
severance ring. Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred
near the ET/SRB attach point and on the systems tunnel cover.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good
condition. In general, minor trailing edge damage to the FJPS
and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension. A 3/8"xi/8" piece of slag
was embedded in the aft side of the forward field joint K5NA
closeout at 140 degrees. Three divots to substrate (2.8"x2.0"
at 180 degrees; 2.6"x2.0" at 186 degrees; 3.0"x2.0" at 192
degrees) were present in the forward center segment GEI cork
closeout at XB-1099 near the -Z axis away from the Orbiter. One
of the divots was sooted on the forward edge of the material.
Since additional unbonds were found adjacent to the missing
material, the remaining cork was removed for further analysis.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. All three
aft booster stiffener rings, the upper strut fairing, a section
of the ETA ring/IEA sustained water impact damage. The aft
booster stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were intact and
no K5NA material was missing.
The phenolic material on the kick ring had delaminated. Some
K5NA protective domes were missing from bolt heads on the aft
side of the phenolic kick ring prior to water impact (charred
substrate) . The aft skirt acreage TPS was generally in good
condition with the exception of two divots measuring 4"x3" and
3"x2" located between the single BSM and the +Y axis at XB-
1860. Sooting pattern showed time of occurrence to be descent.
K5NA was missing from all aft BSM nozzles (Figure 9).
All four Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were properly
seated. This was the eighth flight utilizing the optimized
link. None of the EPON shim material was lost prior to water
impact.
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The LH frustum had 15 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners and was
missing MSA-2 from one location near the -Z axis. There was
minor localized blistering of the Hypalon paint. The BSM aero
heat shield covers were locked in the fully opened position,
but the two RH cover attach rings had been bent at the hinge by
parachute riser entanglement.
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The LH forward skirt exhibited no MSA-2 debonds or missing TPS.
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tThe phenolic plates on both RSS antennae were intact. However,
most of the ablator on the +Z antenna cover was lost at water
impact (clean substrate) and was not a debris concern.
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Three divots to substrate were present in the forward center
segment GEI cork closeout at XB-1099 near the -Z axis away from
the Orbiter. One of the divots was sooted at the forward edge
of the material. Post flight assessment revealed an adhesive
failure between the EA934 and the paint. The application
procedure was subsequently modified.
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K5NA protective domes were missing from the aft side of the
phenolic kick ring prior to water impact (sooted substrate) .
Two divots occurred in the aft skirt acreage TPS between the
single BSM and the +Y axis. The sooting pattern indicated the
loss of material occurred during re-entry.
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6.3 RECOVERED SRB DISASSEMBLY FINDINGS
Post flight disassembly of the Debris Containment System (DCS)
housings revealed an overall system retention of 99 percent and
individual holddown post retention percentages as listed:
% of Nut without % of Ordnance
HDP # 2 large halves fragments % Overall
1 99 88 97
2 99 98 99
3 99 94 99
4 99 94 99
5 99 95 99
6 99 95 99
7 99 94 99
8 99 94 99
STS-50 was the eighth flight to utilize the new "optimized"
frangible links in the holddown post DCS's. The link was
designed to increase the DCS plunger velocity and improve the
seating alignment while leaving the stud ejection velocity the
same. The design was intended to prevent ordnance debris from
falling out of the DCS yet not increase the likelihood of a
stud hang-up. According to NSTS-07700, the Debris Containment
System should retain a minimum of 90 percent of the ordnance
debris.
Post flight assessment on the loss of cork material from the LH
forward center segment GEI closeout revealed an adhesive
failure between the EA934 and the paint. The problem was traced
to application/technique. PR PV6-222762 was elevated to IFA
STS-50-M-01.
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 9.
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7.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
A post landing inspection of OV-102 (Columbia) was conducted on
9-10 July 1992 at the Kennedy Space Center on Shuttle Landing
Facility (SLF) Runway 33 and in the Orbiter Processing Facility
(OPF) to identify debris impact damage and, if possible, debris
sources. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 184 hits, of
which 45 had a major dimension of one inch or larger. This
total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat
shield attributed to SSME vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume
recirculation. A comparison of these numbers to statistics from
32 previous missions of similar configuration (excluding
missions STS-23, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42 which had damage
from known debris sources), indicates that the total number of
hits is higher than average and the number of hits one inch or
greater is much higher than average. Figures 10-13 show the TPS
debris damage assessment for STS-50.
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 141 hits, of
which 28 had a major dimension of one inch or larger. The most
significant tile damage measured 9"x4.5"x0.5", spanned three
tiles, and was located approximately 3 feet outboard of the LH2
ET/ORB umbilical. The size and depth is indicative of an impact
by a low density material, such as ET TPS foam, and was most
likely caused by the loss of the -Y bipod ramp closeout in
flight.
A significant concentration of hits greater than one inch (11
total) were present on the middle one-third of the RH wing.
This concentration of hits may have been caused by ice and TPS
foam from the L02 feedline bellows, support brackets, and
flange closeouts. The distribution of the remainder of the hits
on the lower surface does not point to a single source of
ascent debris, but indicates a shedding of ice and Thermal
Protection System (TPS) debris from random sources.
The following table breaks down the STS-50 Orbiter debris
damage by area:
Hits > i" Total Hits
Lower Surface
Upper Surface
Right Side
Left Side
RH OMS Pod
LH OMS Pod
28 141
1 II
I0 2O
2 7
0 0
4 5
Totals 45 184
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels,
tires, or brakes. The main landing gear tires were considered
to be in good condition with less than expected wear for a
heavy Orbiter weight and a KSC runway landing.
62
Figure 10.
/2 x 1 x 1/4
issing 1 x 1/2
-1/2 x 1/2
D
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
Three Hits < 1 Inch\
1Dia. x 1
1 x 3/4 x 3/8
1-1/4 x 1/2 x 1/4
Missing 3-1/2 x 1
1-1/2 x 1/4 x 1/4
Z
Protruding Gap Filler
6
Five Hits with
One _ I Inch
(1-1/4 x 1/2 x 1/4)
Four Hits <1 Inch
Seven Hits with
One _i Inch (1 x 1 x 1/8)
ng Gap Filler
3 x 1 x 1/2
x 1/8 x 1/4
I Dia. x 1/8
Z
m 1 x 3/4 x 1/2
i-1/2 x 3/4 x 3/4
1-3/4 x 1 x 1/2
1 x 3/4 x 1/8
1 x 1/4 x 1/8
1-1/2 x I/2 x 1/4
1-1/2 x 1/4 x 1/8
3 x I-3/4 x I/8
I-1/4 x 1/4 x 1/8
2 x 3/8 x 1/8
1-1/4 x 1/4 x 1/8
1-1/4 x 1/4 x 1/8
1-1/4 x 3/4 x I/8
1-1/4 x 3/4 x 3/8
TOTAL HITS -- 141
HITS > 1 INCH = 28
ALL DIMENSIONS
IN INCHES
1-1/4 x 1/2 x 1/4
63
Figure 11. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
cO cO
x
• x '-_
x _
. cM x
• !
64
_ cO
x
x
x
x
._---I
TOTAL HITS = zo
HITS > 1 INCH = lO
Figure 12. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
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Figure13. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
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An expended detonator/electrical connector (2 pieces: P/N SEB
26100001 03-89 19113) from the umbilical separation system
fell to the runway when the RH (L02) ET umbilical door was
opened. A PR was initiated by Pyro engineering to document
this anomaly. ET/Orbiter (EO) separation ordnance device
plungers 2 and 3 were seated and appeared to have functioned
properly. No anomalies were externally visible on EO-I.
There was no visible damage to the RCC nosecap or wing leading
edge panels. White streaks were present on the RH wing leading
edge panels #2, 6, 17, and 18.
All Orbiter windows exhibited lighter than usual hazing. Win-
dow #4 exhibited a few light streaks. Wipes were taken from
all windows for laboratory analysis. Orbiter window perimeter
tile damage was minimal. Detailed examination of the windows
revealed on-orbit debris impacts to windows #2, 3, 4, 6, and
8. The depth of the impacts ranged from 0.0029 to 0.0055
inches, which exceeded the acceptance criteria of 0.0006
inches. The depth of the impact site on window #4 was not
measured but estimated to be greater than 0.004 inches.
Post flight inspection also revealed 47 dings and micro-
meteorite impacts on the radiators. The discrepancies ranged
from tape damage to holes through the tape/facesheet. The
attitude of the Orbiter during the STS-50 mission is con-
sidered to be the major reason for the high number on-orbit
debris impacts.
Samples were taken for laboratory analysis from other selected
sites as shown in Figure 14.
Damage to the base heat shield tiles was less than average.
The SSME #3 DMHS closeout blanket was badly torn and frayed
from 8:00 to I0:00 o'clock. Two of the sacrificial patches
from this area were missing. The blanket on SSME #2 was in
good condition. The sacrificial patch on the SSME #I blanket
from 4:00 to 6:30 o'clock exhibited significant fraying.
Runway 33 was inspected and swept by EG&G SLF personnel on
8 July 1992 and all potentially damaging debris was removed.
The condition of the runway was acceptable for landing.
The post landing inspection of Runway 33 was performed
immediately after landing. This flight marked the first use of
the Orbiter drag chute for a KSC landing and the second time
the drag chute was used in the program. The drag chute
functioned nominally. However, one tile on the lower (-Z), RH
edge of the drag chute door opening was slightly damaged by
door ejection. All Orbiter drag chute related hardware was
recovered (reference Figure 15) and showed no signs of
anomalies. Two FRSI plugs, most likely from the base heat
shield area, was the only unexpected flight hardware found on
the runway.
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Figure 14. CHEMICAL SAMPLE LOCATIONS
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A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) was used to measure
the surface temperatures of several areas on the vehicle. Nine
minutes after landing the Orbiter nosecap RCC was 202 degrees
F. Twenty-two minutes after landing, the RH wing leading edge
RCC panel #9 was 118 degrees F and panel #17 was 115 degrees
F (reference Figure 16).
In summary, the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits was
higher than average and the number of hits with a major dimen-
sion of one inch or greater was much higher than average (by
slightly more than two sigma) when compared to previous
flights (reference Figures 17-19).
Orbiter Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 9.
7O
Figure 16. STS- 50RCC TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS AS
RECORDED BY THE SHU'I'rLE THERMAL IMAGER
TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS
RCC PANEL 17115
TIME _:05 EDT
RCCPANEL9 118
TIME F_:(35 FrlT
ORBITER:
MISSION:
ALL MEASUREMENTS IN
DEGREES FAHRENHEIT
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NOSECAP 202
TIME 7:52 EDT
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FIGURE 17: ORBITER POST FLIGHT DEBRIS DAMAGE SUMMARY
LOWER SURFACE ENTIRE VEHICLE
HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS
STS-6 15 80 36 120
STS4Y 3 29 7 56
STS-9 (41-A) 9 49 14 58
STS-11 (41-B) 11 19 34 63
STS-13 (41-C) 5 27 8 36
STS-14 (41-£)) 10 44 30 111
STS-17 (41-G) 25 69 36 154
STS-19 (51-A) 14 66 20 87
STS-20 (51-C) 24 87 28 81
STS-27 (51-1) 21 96 33 141
STS-28 (51_1) 7 66 17 111
STS-30 (61-A) 24 129 34 183
STS-31 (61-B) 37 177 55 257
STS-32 (61-C) 20 134 39 193
STS-29 18 100 23 132
STS-28R 13 60 20 76
STS-34 17 51 18 53
STS-33R 21 107 21 118
STS-32R 13 111 15 120
STS-36 17 61 19 81
ST_31R 13 47 14 63
STS_41 13 64 16 76
STS-38 7 70 8 81
STS-35 15 132 17 147
STS-37 7 91 10 113
STS-39 14 217 16 238
STS-40 23 153 25 197
STS_43 24 122 25 131
STS_I8 14 100 25 182
STS_I4 6 74 9 101
STS_5 18 122 22 172
STS49 6 55 11 114
AVERAGE 15.1 87.2 22.0 120.2
SIGMA 7.3 44.0 10.7 54.0
STS-50 .... 28 14i 45 184
MISSIONS STS-23, 24, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 3OR, AND 42 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ANAL YSIS
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOURCES
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This flight marked the first use of the Orbiter drag chute for
a KSC landing and the second time the drag chute was used in
the Shuttle program.
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Deployment of the drag chute was nominal. The risers did not
contact the SSME #i nozzle or the rudder/speed brake. All drag
chute related hardware was recovered.
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Overall view of Orbiter left side
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Overall view of Orbiter right side.
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/Overall view of Orbiter nose. No anomalies were visible on the
forward RCS thrusters
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Tile damage site on the left side' of the Orbiter approximately
3 feet outboard of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical measured 9 x 4.5 x
0.5 inches. The size and depth is indicative of an impact by a
low density material such as External Tank TPS foam and was
most likely caused by the loss of the LH bipod ramp closeout in
flight.
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An expended detonator electrical connector from the umbilical
separation system fell to the runway when the RH (LO2) ET/ORB
umbilical door was opened.
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Overall view of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation
ordnance devices appeared to have functioned properly.
82
COLO[i ?i.__ _-O_2R,,','P_-I

Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation
ordnance devices appeared to have functioned properly.
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All Orbiter windows exhibited lighter than usual hazing
with a few light streaks visible on window #4
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The depth of an impact site on window #4 was estimated to be
0.004 inches, which exceeds the acceptance criteria of 0.0006
inches
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vDamage to the base heat shield tiles was less than average. The
SSME #3 DMHS closeout blanket was badly torn and frayed from
8:00 to i0:00 o'clock. Two of the sacrificial patches from this
area were missing.
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8.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS
A total of ii samples were obtained from Orbiter OV-102 during
the STS-50 post landing debris assessment at Kennedy Space
Center (Figure 14). The eleven submitted samples consisted of 8
window wipes, 2 residual samples from damage sites on the lower
surface tiles, and 1 residual sample from an Orbiter vertical
stabilizer tile damage site. The samples were analyzed by the
NASA KSC Microchemical Analysis Branch (MAB) for material
composition and comparison to known STS materials. Debris
analysis involves the placing and correlating of particles with
respect to composition, thermal (mission) effects, and
availability. Debris sample results and analyses are listed by
Orbiter location in the following summaries.
Orbiter Windows
Results of the window sample analysis revealed the presence of
the following materials:
1. Metallics
2. RTV, silica tile, glass fibers, insulation
3. Cerium-rich materials
4. Paints, dust, rust, and salt
5. Organics
6. Earth compounds
Debris analysis provides the following correlations:
I. Metallic particles (brass, aluminum, zinc and carbon
steel alloys) are common to SRB/BSM exhaust residue,
but are not considered a debris concern in this
quantity (micrometer) and have not generated a known
debris effect.
2. RTV, silica tile, glass fibers, and insulation
originate from Orbiter thermal protection system (TPS) .
3. Cerium-rich materials originate from Orbiter window
polishing compounds.
4. Paint is of flight hardware/facility/GSE origin; dust
and salt are naturally-occurring landing site products;
rust is an SRB BSM exhaust residue.
5. Organics were found to be cellulosic fibers (sample
cloth); polymeric (urethane,nylon), phenolic/acrylic
and butyl adhesive, which is typical of protective
cover type materials.
6. Earth compounds (calcite, salt and alpha-quartz)
originate from the landing site.
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Orbiter Tile Damage Site
Results of the Orbiter tile damage site samples indicated the
presence of the following materials:
1. Silica-rich dense tile (coating)
2. Silica-rich fibrous tile
Debris analysis provides the following correlations:
I. Silica-rich dense tile (coating) originates from the
Orbiter thermal protection system (TPS).
2. Silica-rich fibrous tile originates from the Orbiter
thermal protection system (TPS) .
Orbiter Vertical Stabilizer
Results from the Orbiter vertical stabilizer tile damage site
revealed the presence of the following materials:
I. Silica-Aluminum-Calcium glass fiber
2. Silica-rich coating
Debris analysis provides the following correlations:
i. Silica-Aluminum-Calcium glass fiber is identifiable as
an E-glass, such as MBO-135-009, but is typically used
as a structural coating under TPS and is not usually
found on Orbiter exterior surfaces. However this type
material can be found on other spacecraft. In this
specific case, no transport mechanism has been
identified.
2. Silica-rich coating originates from the Orbiter TPS
Conclusions
The STS-50 mission sustained Orbiter tile damage to a greater
than average degree. The chemical analysis results from post
flight samples did not provide data that points to a single
source of damaging debris. This report includes STS chemical
sampling results from previous missions in tabular format
(reference Figure 20) though the information contained in the
table did not provide trend data to account for the increase in
debris damage sites for this mission.
Orbiter window samples revealed Orbiter TPS, window polishing
compound, BSM exhaust residue, landing site products, organics,
and paint. The Orbiter tile damage site sample results provided
evidence of TPS materials. A structural coating-type material
was found at the vertical stabilizer damage site and is still
under investigation.
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9.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES
Based on the debris inspections and film review,
Launch Anomalies, including three IFA candidates,
served on the STS-50 mission.
12 Post
were ob-
9.1 LAUNCH PAD/FACILITY
I. A loose electrical conduit cap on the east side of the SSME
flame exhaust hole was removed during the Ice Team Inspection
at T-3 hours.
9.2 EXTERNAL TANK
1. Approximately 60 percent of the LH bipod ramp closeout was
missing to a depth that exposed part of the spindle housing
along with some of the intertank acreage foam at the leading
edge of the ramp (26" x i0" total damage site). Debris damage
to Orbiter TPS was greater than average including a
9"x4.5"x0.5" damage site on the lower surface approximately 3
feet outboard of the LH2 umbilical. Loss of the bipod ramp
closeout could be the result of TPS material failure on the ET
intertank acreage due to inadequate venting. This event
appeared similar to the occurrence on STS-7. (IFA STS-50-I-01)
2. The RH jack pad closeout and some adjacent foam was missing
creating a 6-inch diameter divot. (IFA candidate)
3. Numerous areas of TPS erosion and small divots occurred on
the thrust strut flange closeouts, the L02 feedline flange
closeouts, six of the pressurization line ramps, and two of
the cable tray ice/frost ramps. A 7-inch diameter divot oc-
curred on the inboard side of the L02 feedline support bracket
at XT-1377.
4. Small divots and TPS erosion occurred on the L02 ET/ORB um-
bilical cable tray (horizontal section). Six divots, including
one that spanned the entire width of the cable tray, were
present on the +Z side of the vertical section.
9.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
i. The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had 26 MSA-2 debonds
over fasteners. The LH frustum had 15 MSA-2 debonds over
fasteners and was missing MSA-2 (2-inch diameter) from one
location near the -Z axis.
2. A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #4. A 6"x3" piece of the
EPON shim material had been pulled off by the stud at liftoff.
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3. A 2"xl" piece of EPON shim material was lost from the HDP
#3 aft skirt foot prior to water impact.
4. Three divots to substrate (2.8"x2.0" at 180 degrees;
2.6"x2.0" at 186 degrees; 3.0"x2.0" at 192 degrees) were
present in the GEI cork closeout at XB-1099 on the forward
center segment. One of the divots was sooted on the forward
edge of the material. The surrounding cork material was
unbonded. (IFA STS-50-M-01)
9.4 ORBITER
I. An orange GSE tile shim originated near the RIA thruster
and fell aft during SSME ignition.
2. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 184 hits, of which 45
had a major dimension of one inch or larger. The total number
of Orbiter TPS debris hits was higher than average and the
number of hits with a major dimension of one inch or greater
was much higher than average when compared to previous
flights.
3. An expended detonator/electrical connector (2 pieces: P/N
SEB 26100001 03-89 19113) from the umbilical separation system
fell to the runway when the RH (L02) ET umbilical door was
opened.
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Appendix A. JSC Photographic Analysis Summary
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August 17, 1992
The following Summary of Significant Events report is from the Johnson Space Center NSTS
Photographic and Television Analysis Project, STS-50 Final Report, and was completed
August 10, 1992. Publication numbers are LESC-30375 and JSC-25951. The actual
document can be obtained through the LESC library/333-6594 or Christine Dailey/483-5336
of the NSTS Photographic and Television Analysis Project.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
2.1 Launch Events
The launch of STS-50 occurred normally. No events were observed which were not within the
experience base of the JSC screening personnel. Normal events observed included: normal pad
debris; SRB flame duct debris; RCS paper debris; white debris (probably ice) from the ET/Orbiter,
TSM umbilical areas and the GUCP disconnect during liftoff; vapor from the GUCP after liftoff;
twang; slight vibration from the elevons at liftoff; MLP debris in the SLV exhaust plume after
liftoff; ET aft dome outgassing and charring after liftoff; vapor off SRB stiffener rings after liftoff;
condensation trails from the SLV after the roll maneuver;, multiple white flashes in the SSME
plume at approximately 14 to 16 seconds MET; indication of wind shear in the SRB plume;
atmospheric bow waves; dark puffs in the SRB plume and SRB exhaust plume brightening at tail
off. Other than the RSRB bolt hang up on HDP #M-4 the following items axe not considered
anomalous but merit mentioning. A detailed analysis for some of these events is located in
Appendix D.
STS-50 Final Report
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
2.2 RSRB Bolt ltang Up at Holddown Post #M-4
(Camera E-O07)
Figure 2.2 (A) RSRB Holddown Bolt Hang Up - Fully Extended
A bolt hang up on the RSRB holddown post #M-4 was noted. The bolt hung up in the SRB debris
containment system (DCS) area. Full extension of the bolt occurred at 0.554 seconds MET. At
this time, the top of the bolt was 10 inches above the shoe. After the bolt release, the bolt had a
sudden small deflection to the left of the camera field of view. Three pieces of epon shim material
were noted falling from the SRB foot during the time of bolt hang up
A review of previous occurrences of bolt hang ups since reflight was conducted. Bolt hang ups
have occurred on five previous missions since reflight. Four of the five bolt hang ups were on the
RSRB. The other missions where bolt hang ups have occurred were STS-34 (RSRB holddown
post #M-2), STS-33 (RSRB holddown post #M-3), STS-39 (RSRB holddown post #M-I), STS-
43 (LSRB holddown post #M-7), and STS-45 (RSRB holddown post #M-4). No further
photographic analysis is expected.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
Figure 2.2 (B) RSRB Holddown Bolt Hang Up - Retracting
2.3 Debris
Other than the small orange piece of debris seen on camera E-012, none of the debris described
below was visually confirmed to strike the launch vehicle.
2.3.1 Debris Near the Time of SSME Ignition
(Camera O TV-O09 )
A small light-colored piece of debris (possibly ice) originated from the LH2 ET/Orbiter umbilical
disconnect area, traveled toward the 4" recirculation line and then fell aft prior to liftoff. This
debris may have hit the 4" line but no damage to the umbilical was visible.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
The usual amount of ice debris from the LO2 and LH2 TSM T-0 umbilicals and the ET/Orbiter
umbilicals were noted on many of the MLP camera films prior to and during liftoff.
2.3.2 Debris Near the Time of SRB Ignition
2.3.2.1 DCS Debris at Liftoff
(Camera E-O12)
A single small dark piece of debris appeared to originate from the LSRB HDP #M-5 debris
containment system (DCS) area at PIC firing and fell into the LSRB flame duct.
2.3.2.2 Debris Falling along the Left Inboard Elevon
(Camera E-018)
Two fiat white/red pieces of debris fell aft along the left inboard elevon prior to liftoff. The origin
of the debris could not be determined. The debris did not appear to strike the vehicle.
2.3.2.3 Debris Striking the LSRB Aft Skirt
(Camera E-O12 )
A small orange piece of debris (origin unknown) struck the LSRB aft skirt at SSME startup. No
damage was noted.
2.3.2.4 RCS Butcher Paper Near the Vertical Stabilizer
(Camera OTV-070 )
A single small fight-colored piece of debris originated from behind the vertical stabilizer and moved
into the SSME exhaust plume area at 0.656 seconds MET. The debris did not appear to strike the
vehicle. This debris was determined to be RCS butcher paper on subsequent camera views.
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2.0 Summary of Sirnificant Events Analysis
2.3.2.5 Flexible Debris from the RSRB Flame Duct (Task #7)
(Camera E-O01, E-O04, E-O15)
A single dark flexible piece of debris originated from the RSRB flame duct and traveled north away
from the vehicle at liftoff.
Figure 2.3.2.5 RSRB Duct Debris
A flexible piece of dark debris was noted coming from the RSRB flame duct area during screening
of the mission photography. The trajectory of this piece of debris was digitized on a Film Motion
Analyzer from Cameras E-001 and E-015 film. The debris emerged from the flame duct area after
liftoff and fell back into the flame duct area as the vehicle traveled away from the MLP. Velocity
was calculated using a two camera solution. The velocity of this flexible debris was 17.9 feet per
second over the entire interval. The observed debris did not appear to strike the vehicle. A plot of
position versus time is in Appendix D Task #7.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
2.3.3 Debris After Liftoff
2.3.3.1 Debris Observed After Roll Maneuver
(Camera E-212, E-213)
A single light colored piece of debris, probably baggie material, originated from behind the left
inboard elevon and fell aft following roll maneuver.
A single piece of white debris, probably RCS paper, fell aft along the inboard area of the right
wing after the roll maneuver.
2.3.3.2 Numerous Pieces of Debris of Unknown Origin
(Cameras E-213, E-222)
Multiple pieces of white debris were seen falling aft of the SLV after the roll maneuver at 28.267
seconds MET.
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2.{) Summary of Significant Events Analysis
2.4 MLP Events
2.4.1 Base Heat Shield Erosion
(Cameras E-023, E-024)
Figure 2.4.1 Base Heat Shield Erosion
Three erosion chips were noted on the base heat shield between SSME #1 and #3 and at least eight
small chips were noted on the base heat shield on the left side near SSME #1 and #2. Base heat
shield erosion has been seen on previous mission films. No follow tip action has been requested.
STS-50 Final Report
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2.0 Summar), of Significant Events Analysis
2.4.2 ()range Vapor
(Camera OTV-063, OTV-070, E-O03, E-O05, E-O15, E-O17, E-O18, E-O19, E-020,
E-023, E-030, E-062, E-063, E-076)
Figure 2.4.2 Orange Vapor Noted at SSME Startup
Orange vapor (possibly free-burning hydrogen) was seen below the SSMEs prior to SSME
ignition. This vapor appeared to be similar to that noted on previous missions. The vapor was
noted moving north beneath the body flap due to wind conditions at the pad just prior to SSME
ignition.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
2.4.3 Flashes in SSME Plumes at Engine Startup
(Cclmcras F.-O01, E-O02, E-O03, E-Old)
Figure 2.4.3 Flash in SSME #1 Mach Diamond
Multiple orange colored flashes were seen in the SSME #1 and #2 exhaust plumes after SSME
st_u'tup while the vehicle was still on the pad. Flashes in the SSME exhaust plumes at engine
ignition has been seen on previous missions. No further analysis is expected.
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2.0 Summary of Si[_nificant Events Analysis
Ascent Events
Loose RSRB Thermal Curtain Tape
(Camera E-O05, E-O09)
Figure 2.5.1 Loose RSRB Thermal Curtain Tape
A loose piece of thermal curtain tape was noted on the RSRB at liftoff (1.393 seconds MET).
follow up action is expected.
No
STS-50 Final Report
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
2.5.2 Flexing Motion of the RSRB Thermal Curtain
(Camera E-212)
Figure 2.5.2 Flexing in RSRB Thermal Curtain
A flexing motion of the RSRB thermal curtain was noted after the roll maneuver. Film E-212 was
reviewed from the previous mission, STS-49, and the identical flexing motion of the RSRB
thermal curtain was observed. The flexing motion is considered a normal event that is probably an
optical effect caused by viewing through the engine exhaust gases. No further action is expected.
2.5.3 Flares in SSME Plume
(Cameras E-052, E-213, E-222, E-223, KTV-21A)
Multiple flares were seen in the SSME exhaust plume after liftoff on these long range tracking
views. The flares were timed at 6.163, 14.890, 22.586, 27.872, 30.160, 34.322, and 36.992
seconds MET using cameras with digital timing. The flares on the films with binary coded timing
STS-50 Final Report
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
have been timed and the results are located in Appendix C. Flares during this time period have
been seen on several earlier missions. No further analysis is expected.
2.5.4 Recirculation (Task #1)
(Cameras ET-207, ET-208, E-208, KTV-13)
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV prior to SRB separation
has been seen on nearly all of the previous missions. For STS-50, the start of recirculation was
observed at about 98 seconds MET and the end was noted at approximately 110 seconds MET on
Camera E-208. See Appendix D for a summary of re,circulation start and stop times for all
missions since reflight.
Cameras on which recirculation was observed for STS-50
CAMERA START seconds MET) STOP seconds MET)
KTV-13 98 107
ET-207
ET-208
*E-208 98 110
* BEST VIEW OF RECIRCULATION
NOTE: Intermittent LOV of the vehicle due to clouds prevented acquisition of specific start and stop times
for recirculation on cameras ET-207 and ET-208.
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2.(I Summary ot' Significant Events Analysis
2.6 I)1'()-0312 Analysis
2.6.1 Analysis o{" ()nboard l'hologral)hY of 1,71' - Method l Umbilical Well
(Tamera Evalualion ('la,d_" //5 )
This l_h_m_:Jal_hic l)cl:lilcd Test Objective (DTO) w:ls twrlormcd using two 16 illn'i ;.tlld one 35 mill
umlqlical \\ ell t_';tnlcl*l.lS.(;()()d photographic coverage \v'<tsclot',lined from LSRB sCp;.lratiOll;
hoxvc'\ or. <lirccl <,l_nlight s',illtl",ilos tile POV after E'F scp,uaition obscurrin 7 a ma.ior poriion of all
lhrcc Iiln>
Figure 2.6.1 (A) l)ivo! on the LH2 lnleriank lnlerface Near the Bipodas
Viewed by 35mm Camera in the Oxygen !!mbilical Well
A rectangular shaped divot, measuring 26.5 inches in length and 9._:I (at its largest) to 4.9 inches in
width, was seen on the i_H2/Intertank flange at the PAL ramp at the base of ltle left leg of the
forward ET/Orbiter attach bip¢xJ (arrow 1). The forward bip(_t is in the "standup" position (arrow
2). The gray colored ai-c{t lit the base of the divot appears to hr." Ihc tiildcrlying ET strtlCltirt." (,tirloW
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
3). Shuttle engineers are reviewing this data as a I_)ssible source for the large debris strike
obscrved near the LH2 umbilical well. Two other smaller divots are seen on this image; one near
the right leg of the bipod (arrow 4) and the other near the LO2 feedline at a clamp below the LH2
intertank interface (arrow 5).
Multiple divots or eroded areas to the right of the ET LO2 umbilical, chipping of the TPS on the
bracket over the LO2 feedline, press lines, TPS chipping on the aft ET/Orbiter attach brace and a
white linear mark by the electric cable tray were seen further aft on the ET. The ET LO2 umbilical
appeared to hc frcc of ice, which is in contrast to the ET LH2 umbilical.
Figure 2.6.1 (B) LSRB Separation as Viewed by 16mm Umbilical Cameras
Figure 2.6.1 (B) was acquired shortly after SRB separation. Multiple small bright particles
(probably TPS flakes) were in view prior to SRB separation. No anomalies were detected during
the SRB separation sequence. A white substance, possibly ice, can be seen on the LSRB attach
ring (arrow 1). Normal charring and erosion of the ET Thermal Protection System (TPS) can be
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
seen ill tilt" field cd vicxv IFOV) (arrow 2). Shortly after SRB separation, a piece of debris
¢_rigi_mtin_ In_m ttw I.112 tmlbilical area traveled toward the I.SRB and then fell aft.
Figure 2.6.1 (C) Orange Vapor Visible to the Left of the ET
as Viewed by 16mm Umbilical Cameras
The vapor observed from Figure 2.6.1 (C) is probably cause by the RCS firing (arrow 1). Ice was
observed in the ET LH2 umbilical disconnect (arrow 2). Slight erosion of the ET aft dome TPS
was observed (arrow 3). Multiple pieces of white debris (probably ice) traveled through the FOV
before, during and after ET separation (arrow 4). Shortly after ET separation, the sun saturates the
FOV.
STS-50 Final Report
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Anal'2.0 Summar of Si nificant Events ,sis
2.6.2 Analysis of Onboard Photography of ET -
Photography Analysis (Task #6)
(STS-50-71-001 through STS-50-71-089)
Method 20nboard ET
Eighty-nine 70 mm Hasselblad frames were reviewed. The first sixty-five frames were acquired
while the W-8 UV filter was still mounted in the overhead window. These frames were
underexposed. None of the 70 mm photography showed divots in the ET SOFI area or on the
LH2 and LO2 intertank interfaces. No mensuration analysis was performed.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
Figure 2.6.2 View of -Y Side of ET (STS-50-71-004)
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
The -Y side of the ET can be seen in Figure 2.6.2. This photograph was taken approximately 5
minutes 40 seconds after ET separation. The ET TPS appears to be in good condition. The bright
area by the left leg of the forward bipod (arrow 1) is the PAL ramp that was seen to be damaged on
the review of the 35mm umbilical well camera film. The SRB burn scars on the ET Ogive appears
normal.
2.7 Landing Events
No anomalies were detected during the landing of STS-50. The following analyses have been
performed as part of the normal mission operations. Drag chute events have been timed. Further
analysis will not be performed because KSC cameras do not provide sufficient location and
pointing information. Located in Appendix D Task #10 is the KSC report of where the pieces of
the drag chute system landed on the runway.
2.7.1 Elevon Deflection During Landing (Task #11)
(Camera EL-O09 )
The JSC Flight Control Office/EG311 requested that a photographic analysis be performed on the
landing views of the orbiter in order to determine if there was a measurable difference in the left
and right outboard elevon positions. Telemetry data indicated up to a 3 degree difference in the left
and right elevons during the landing approach. Camera EL-009, which is a view of the aft end of
the orbiter during landing, was used for the analysis. Points on the right wing inboard and
outboard elevons were measured and compared to the points taken on the left wing inboard and
outboard elevon during the final approach and again after main gear touchdown when the elevon
was at the maximum up deflection. The times for the start and stop frames for each sequence were
read from the binary code. The raw data was scaled to the orbiter and submitted to the JSC Flight
Control Office/EG311 for comparison against the telemetry data. The timing information is located
Appendix C and the positional information is located in Appendix D Task #11.
2.7.2 Sink Rate Analysis (Task #3)
2.7.2.1 Landing Sink Rate Using Film
(Cameras EL-O09 )
Camera EL-009 film was used to determine the sink rate of the main gear. Both the right and left
inboard tires were used to scale the measurements. Data was gathered for 1.058 seconds prior to
landing through touchdown. Six reference points on every other frame over this time period were
digitized. The reference points consisted of the top and bottom of both the right and left main gears
and the two points on the runway immediately beneath the main gear wheels. The raw data was
corrected for in each observation. The distance between the bottom of the main gear wheels and
the runway was computed. A linear regression was applied on the normalized vertical distance
versus time data to determined the actual sink rate. The sink rate was determined to be 1.8
feet/second which is well within the current threshold limits.
Nose gear touchdown occurred approximately 18 seconds after main gear touchdown which is
longer than normal. No STS-50 landing views were sufficient to calculate an accurate nose gear
sink rate.
Graphs depicting the above data are located in Appendix D Task #3.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
2.7.2.2 Landing Sink Rate Using Video
(Camera KTV-33)
Data from camera KTV-33 was used to determine the sink rate of the main gear. The outer right
main landing gear wheel was used as a reference scale for each frame. The position of the main
gear as a function of time was found by taking the difference between the raw vertical positions of
the main landing gear and a fixed point near the edge of the runway. The data was collected over
21 frames separated by 1/15 seconds (ie. every other frame was used) from approximately one
second before touchdown until touchdown. Using an average scale, these differences were
converted to feet. A least squares regression line was calculated from the data and the slope was
used as the average sink rate. The sink rate was found to be 3.1 feet/second.
The sink ratefor the nose gear was also calculated using 21 frames digitized from camera KTV-33
(These frames were also separated by 1/15 seconds). A linear regression of the data was calculated
in the same manner as above, except that instead of using a point near the runway as a control the
nose wheel distances were measured with respect to the position of the nose wheel in the first
frame. (This method is somewhat less accurate than using a control point, but no good horizontal
control point could be found.) The slope of this line was used as the sink rate and was found to be
1.87 feet per second.
See Appendix D Task #3 for details.
Results from the film analysis are considered better than video because of the higher spatial
resolution. The quantization error inherent in the use of the video makes this analysis insufficient
to meet the 0.1 feet per second precision required by the OMSRB.RCNSD500002DV51.P.001.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
2.7.3 Drag Chute Performance (Task #10)
(Cameras EL-O09, Handheld Mavica)
Figure 2.7.3 Full Inflation of Drag Chute in Disreefed Configuration
STS-50 was the second test of the Space Shuttle landing drag chute and the first time this
functional test was performed on Columbia (OV-102). All of the events occurred as expected.
The various stages are drag chute initiation, pilot chute inflation, bag release, chute inflation in
reefed configuration, disreefing initiation, full chute inflation and chute release. The times for
these events are located in Appendix C and are summarized in Appendix D Task #10.
STS-50 Final Report
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis
2.7.4 Post Landing Inspection of Damage to the Orbiter
( lhmdheld Mavica and Video Cameras)
The post landing walk down of the orbiter revealed that the vehicle sustained a total of 98 strikes,
of which 27 had a major axis of greater than one inch. The amount and severity of the impact
damage is considered higher than normal and the number of strikes greater than one is higher than
normal.
Figure 2.7.4 (A) Large Impact Strike on the Lower Surface of the Orbiter
The most significant damage to the lower surface of the orbiter measured 9"x4.5"x0.5". This
debris spanned over three tiles between the LH2 ET/Orbiter umbilical and the left inboard elevon.
The divot seen on the ET PAL ramp by the left forward bipod ET/Orbiter attach on the 35ram
umbilical camera film is being studied by shuttle engineers as a possible source for the Orbiter tile
damage shown above.
STS-50 Final Report
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2.0 Summary of Si[Inificant Events Analysis
Figure 2.7.4 (B) Damage to the DMHS Blanket #3
Other damage to the vehicle included damage to the DMHS blankets which surround SSMEs #1
and #3. Damage to DMHS blanket has been seen on the post landing images taken on previous
missions.
STS-50 Final Report
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events Analysis '
2.7.5 Post l,anding Inspection of Debris Found on Runway
(Ham#mid Mavica and Video Cameras)
Figure 2.7.5 Drag Chute Door Runway Strikes
The arrows in Figure 2.7.5 shows the marks left on the runway by the drag chute door after chute
initiation. The marks are to the right of the centerline as expected. This is different than the
position of the door for STS-49 which went to the left of the centerline. The KSC report of the
runway location of the drag chute assembly is located in Appendix D Task #10. Other debris
found on the runway was an expended detonator/electrical connector (2 pieces) from the umbilical
separation system.
STS-50 Final Report
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Appendix B. MSFC Photographic Analysis Summary
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I. INTRODUCTION
Space Shuttle Mission STS-50, the twelfth flight of the
Orbiter Columbia, was conducted June 25, 1992 at approximately
11:12 A.M. Central Daylight Time from Launch Complex 39A
(LC-39A), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. Extensive
photographic and video coverage was provided and has been
evaluated to determine proper operation of the ground and flight
hardware. Cameras (video and cine) providing this coverage are
located on the fixed service structure (FSS), mobile launch
platform (MLP), LC-39B perimeter sites, onboard, and uprange and
downrange tracking sites.
II. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES:
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis
objectives for STS-50 included, but were not limited to the
following.
a. Overall facility and Shuttle vehicle coverage for
anomaly detection
b. Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems
c. Determination of SRB PIC firing time and SRB
separation time
d. Verification of Thermal Protection System (TPS)
integrity
e. Correct operation of the following:
I. Holddownpost blast covers
2. SSME ignition
3. LH2 and LO2 17" disconnects
4. GH2 umbilical
5. TSM carrier plate umbilicals
6. Free hydrogen ignitors
7. Vehicle clearances
8. GH2 vent line retraction and latch back
9. Vehicle motion
There were two special test objectives for this mission.
a. SRB holddown post shoe rotation quantification
b. DTO-0312, ET photography after separation
III. CAMERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT:
Film was received from sixty of sixty-one requested cameras
as well as video from twenty-three of twenty-three requested
cameras. The following table illustrates the camera data
received at MSFC for STS-50.
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CAMERA DATA RECEIVED FOR STS-50
16mm 35mm 70mm Video
MLP 26 0 0 3
FSS 7 0 0 3
Perimeter 3 3 0 6
Tracking 0 15 0 II
Onboard 4 1 1 0
Totals 40 19 1 23
A detailed individual motion picture camera assessment is
provided as Appendix B. Appendix C contains detailed assessments
of the video products received at MSFC.
a. Ground Camera Coverage:
Photographic coverage of STS-50 ranged from good to poor.
Coverage from the trackers was limited due to cloud coverage.
Camera E-12 experienced a timing problem. The timing resets to
zero and continues to stay there throughout liftoff. Cameras
E-4, E-28 and E-36 experienced some camera jitter.
b. Onboard Camera Assessment:
A camera was flown on each SRB forward skirt to record the
main parachute deployment. Both cameras operated properly, but
did not record water impact. Also, the astronauts carried a 70mm
hand-held camera to record film for evaluating the ET TPS
integrity after ET separation. Two 16mm motion picture cameras
and one 35mm still camera were flown on this mission in the
Orbiter's umbilical wells to record the SRB and ET separation
events.
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS:
a. General Observations:
While viewing the film, several events were noted which
occur on most missions. These included: pad debris rising and
falling as the vehicle lifts off; debris induced streaks in the
SSME plume; ice falling from the 17" disconnect and umbilicals
and debris particles falling aft of the vehicle during ascent,
which consist of RCS motor covers, hydrogen fire detectors, purge
barrier material and SRB thermal curtain tape.
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b. SRB Holddown Post M-4 Stud Hang-up:
Figure one is a frame of film taken from camera E-7 showing
holddown post M-4 stud hang-up. The stud appears to remain fully
extended until the SRB aft skirt clears the extended holddown
post stud. The stud also pulled loose several pieces of EPON
shim material.
c. Loose Thermal Curtain Tape:
Figure two is a frame of film taken from camera E-52
showing a piece of loose thermal curtain tape on the right hand
SRB.
d. Pad Debris at T+l.9 Seconds:
Figure two also shows a piece of debris which comes from
the right hand SRB blast hole. This debris was seen on several
cameras. It rises from the blast hole and travels away from the
vehicle without impacting the vehicle.
e. ET TPS Divots:
Figure three is a film frame taken from the 35mm umbilical
well camera showing the aft portion of the ET after separation.
Visible in the photo are several TPS divots. The large divot
appearing between the 17 inch LO2 disconnect and the Orbiter
attach point has been determined to be approximately 8.5 inches
at the longest dimension. Figure four is a film frame from the
35mm umbilical well camera showing the forward portion of the ET
after separation. Several TPS divots are also visible in this
photo. The large divot appearing near the bipod is determined to
be 7 x 21 inches.
V. ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS:
a. T-Zero Times:
T-Zero times were determined from cameras which view the
SRB holddown posts numbers M-l, M-2 and M-6. These cameras
record the explosive bolt combustion products.
POST CAMERA POSITION TIME (UTC)
M-I E-9
M-2 E-8
M-6 E-13
177:16:12:23.007
177:16:12:23.008
177:16:12:23.005
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b. ET Tip Deflection:
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was determined
to be approximately 31.7 inches. Figure five is a data plot
showing the measured motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal
and vertical directions. These data were derived from camera
E-79.
c. SRB Separation Time:
SRB separation time for STS-50 was determined to be
177:16:14:29.34 UTC taken from camera E-208.
d. SRB Holddown Post Shoe Rotation Study:
A study was performed on this mission to determine the aft
skirt/shoe rotation effects at T-Zero due to the radial biasing
of the MLP holddown post to 0.060 inches.
Cameras EXI, EX4, and E-27 were used to provide close-in
coverage of the shoes and holddown posts M-l, M-3, and M-5,
respectively. However, due to excessive camera vibration,
rotation data could not be gathered for holddown post M-7.
Figure six shows the locations of the cameras and holddown
posts and direction of "horizontal motion" relative to the
attached plots.
Figures seven and eight show the target positions of the
motion data taken relative to a stationary target on the MLP.
Figure seven represents posts M-I and M-5. Figure eight
represents post M-3.
The following table provides the RMS data accuracy for each
post measured in inches.
post Horizontal Vertical
M-I +.011 +.013
-.021 -.014
M-3 +.011 +.014
-.009 -.017
M-5 +.015 +.025
-.019 -.029
The motion data are presented in figures nine through
eighteen These data have been filtered to remove the noise from
the interactive digitization process.
127
F i ql_ re ]
J-I_ ]'_J_| :_,,'_ t'_St M 4 _tud ttand-tlp
f,'igure 2
[,_)oso Thermal Curtain Tape
128
ORIG _i'_:,,.,_._F:.':,t:;i.:
COLOR I::'I40TO f.;RAP H

] _] _ _ r_
'I'P,_:; I) i rot :,
129
OR IG t [-4,'-'_,. .P,L',_:-.
COLOR PH,:.}TO_RAP_ t

7"-
k--I
k-
bJ
---J U3
L_ i
LJ (_I3
CL F--
U-_
rl
I----I
F-
k--
b.J
z.-.-
L__I k-.._
_] k--
G__ GL
L__--'I L_J
_J
i i
k:
/
_ i I
\
\,
\,
J
"e-
[ ./_._"T
It "i _ ....
L
-TTT-T T ]- TT
LLJ
L
L_-_
H-I
k--
__J
LLI
L I 'l
"2"-
L_-]
_._j
k--
E,3H :_tlI
Figure 5
" P _"_,{'_I PAGE
COLOL PHOTOGRAPH

QZ
ZO
<_
p__
UO<(
b-k-
UOZ
0111
0__
ry
zo
o<(
Qrr
fi3u
__J_
0<(
TO
I
X
t_
N
I
X
+',
\
I
W
W >-
I
LO
I
_t
X
W
S
+
Figure 6
Camera Locations 131

Figure 7
Target Posit ions ot Holddown Posts H-] and M-5
Figure 8
Target Positions of Holddown Post M-3
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Appendix C. Rockwell Photographic Analysis Summary
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Space Transportation Systems Division
Rack'well International Corporation
12214 Lakewood Boulevard
Downey, C_ifornia 90241
Rockwell
International
August 19, 1992 In Reply Refer to 92M_3490
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas 77058
Attention: L. G. Williams (WA)
Contract NAS9-18500, System Integration,Transndttal ofthe Rockwell
Engineering Photographic Analysis Report for the STS-50 Mission.
The System IntegrationContractor hereby submits the Engineering
Photographic Analysis Summary Report in accordance with the Space Shuttle
Program Launch and Landing Photographic Engineering Evaluation Document
(NSTS 08244t
Extensive photographic and video coverage was provided and has been evaluated
to determine ground and flight performance. Cameras (cine and video)
providing this coverage are located on the Launch Complex 39A Fixed Service
Structure (FSS),Mobile Launch Platform (MLP), various perimeter sites,and
uprange and downrange tracking sitesfor the STS-50 launch conducted on
June 25, 1992, at approximately 9:12 AM (PDT) fi-omthe Kennedy Space Center
(KSC) and forthe landing on July 9,1992 at KSC (4:43AM PDT).
Rockwell received launch films from 84 cameras (61 clue,23 video) and landing
films from 18 cameras (II clue,7 video)to support the STS-50 photographic
evaluation effart.Two films,E-57 and E-77, were not availabledue to camera
malfunctions.
All ground camera coverage for this mission including coverage on the M"LP,
FSS and tracking cameras were good. However, due to the accumulation of
clouds, many ofthe tracking video and Rims reviewed were obstructed after the
vehicle went through the cloud cover. This hampered analysis and possible
detection of debris and/er anomalies.
Overall, the films showed STS-50 to be a clean flight. Several pieces of ice from
the ET/ORB umbilicals were shaken loose at SSME ignition, but no damage to
the Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) was apparent. The usual
condensation and water vapors were seen at the ET aft dome and the SRB
stiffener rings and dissipated _ the completion of the roll maneuver. No
vapor was observed in the vicinity of the rudder/speed brake at li__fl_ Charring
of the ET aft dome knd recirculation were not vim'ble due to heavy cloud cover.
Booster SeparationMotor (BSM) firing and SRB separation appeared normal but
could only be verified by one camera due to the cloud cover.
(Packing Sheet No. DM92-17888)
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A disturbance in the lateralaccelerationstripchart data at liRoffled Rockwell
Engineers (Ascent Separation Systems) to suspect there had been a bolthang-up
on one of the SRB holddown support posts. This assumption was confirmed
when films E-7 and E-10 were reviewed which dearly showed the post M-4 boltto
hang-up at liftoff.The boltalso deflectedduring liftoffuntilthe aft skirtfootrose
sufl_icientlyto release it,causing the boltto spring back to itsoriginalvertical
position.
Nominal performance was seen for the MLP and FSS hardware. FSS deluge
water was activatedpriorto SSME ignitionand the MLP rainbirdswere
activated at approximately I second Mission Elapsed Time (MET), as isnormal.
All blast deflectionshields closedpriorto directSRB exhaust plume
impingement. Both TSM umbilicals released and retractedas designed. The ET
GH2 vent linecarrierdropped normally and latched securely with no rebound.
No anomalies were identifiedwith the ET/ORB LH2 umbilicalhydrogen
dispersal system hardware.
STS-50 was the eigth Right with the optimized attach linkin the SRB holddown
support post Debris Containment Systems (DCS's). The linkis designed to
increase the plunger velocityand seating accuracy, while leaving the holddown
bolt ejectionvelocityunchanged. This prevents frangiblenut fragments and/or
NSI cartridges from fallingfrom the DCS, while not increasing the probabilityof
a holddown bolthang-up. Significantevents that were seen include a bolthang-
up at holddown post M-4 ofthe rightSRB at liftoffand a dark pieceof flexible
debris which originated from the right SRB flame duct and moved north away
from the vehicle. These events and other events noted by the Rockwell film/video
users during the review and analysis of the STS-50 photographic items are
summarized in the following comments. These events are not considered to be a
constraint to next Right.
COMMENTS
I. A hangup of the holddown post M-4 holddown bolton the SRB was seen at
liftofron cameras E-7 and E-10. Rockwell/Downey engineers had previously
reported a disturbance in the lateralaccelerationstripchart data at liftofr
which led them to expect a possibleholddown post bolthangup. This event
was clearlyseen in the photographic review as the M-4 holddown boltrose a
significantamount during liftoffbefore breaking away from the SRB and
springing back into position. No further analysis is planned.
.
t
On Camera E-7 a large piece ofEPON shim material debounded from the
holddown post M-4 aftskirtfootand fellintothe flame duct during liftoff.
This isprobably caused by the M-4 bolt hangup. No further analysis is
planned.
Orange vapor (possiblyfreeburning hydrogen) was seen below the SSME's
justpriorto SSME ignitionon cameras E-3,E-5, E-15,E-17, E-18, E-19, E-20,
E-23, E-62, E-63, E-76 and beneath the body flap(moving north) on camera's
OTV-063, OTV-070, and E-30. This vapor appears tobe similarto the vapor
noted on previous missions. Itisnot an issue and no follow-up actionis
planned.
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, Flexing (an up and down motion) was noted in the base heat shieldin the
centerlinearea between the SSME duster during the early stage ofSSIVIE
ignition. Base heat shield movement has occurred on previous missions
and no follow-up action is planned.
5. On cameras El, E4 & E15 a largepiece offlexibledebris originatedfrom the
RSRB flame trench shortly afterSRB ignition.Does not appear to strike
vehicle. No further analysis planned.
6. On camera E-I 8,Two pieces of debris(originunknown) fallaft from above
the leftinboard elevon priorto liRoff.Does not appear to strikevehicle.
7. Orange flaresand flashesseen in the SSME plumes (E2,E3, E52, E213, E222,
E223). These observations are seen frequently and are understood to be
burning of propellant impurities including RCS paper covers.No follow-up
action is planned.
.
,
During the screening of the 16ram and 35ram umbilical well camera films
an apparent rectangular shaped divotwas seen on the LH2/intertank flange
at the base ofthe leftleg ofthe forward ET/Orbiter attach b/pod. The forward
bipod isin the standup position.Several small divotsor chipping ofthe TPS
was seen near the LO2 feed line,LO2 umbilical and the forward ET/Orbiter
attach. Blow-ups of the ET 16ram & 35ram filmis underway and analysisis
in progress.
The followingevents have been reported on previous missions and observed
on STS-50. These are not ofmajor concern, but are documented here for
information only:
• Ice debrisfallingfrom the ET/Orbiter Umbilical disconnect area.
• Debris (Pad, insta-foam, water trough) in the holddown post areas
and MLP.
• Butcher paper fallingfrom the RCS.
• Recirculationor expansion ofburning gases at the aftend of the SLV
prior toSRB separation.
• SlightTPS erosion on the base heat shieldduring SSN[E start-up.
• Shock waves visibleon the pad at SSME startup.
• Debris piecesin the SSME/SRB plumes.
• Condensation around the SLV afterthe rollmaneuver.
• ET aft dome outgassing and charring.
10. Cameras E33 and E41 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. DV08P.010
requ£res an analysis of"launch pad filmdata to verifythat the initialascent
clearance separation between the leR SRB outer mold lineand the fallingET
vent umbilical structure does not violatethe acceptable margin of safety.
A qualitativeassessment has been conducted and positiveclearances
between the leR SRB and the ET vent umbilicalhave been verified.The films
showed nominal launch pad hardware performance, and no anomalies
were observed forthe SRB body trajectory.
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11. Cameras E7-16 and E27-E28 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No.
DV08P.020 requires an analysis of film data of SRM nozzle during liftoff to
verify nozzle to holddown post drift clearance.
A qualitative assessment of the launch films has been completed. No
anomalies were observed for the SRM nozzle trajectory and positive
clearances between the SRB nozzles and the holddown posts were verified.
12. The landing of STS-50 occurred on runway 33 at the KSC Shuttle landing
facility.Good video and film coverage of the drag chute deploy was obtained.
The drag parachute system performed as expected. All sequenced events
occurred as planned and no hardware anomalies were observed.
Analysis continues in the areas of compartment door trajectory, reeled main
chute operation,and riserpositionrelativeto the Orbiter stinger. The
resultsof thisanalysis willbe used to validate models against actualflight
data, and to allow accurate predictions for future flights.
This letterisof particularinterestto W. J. Gaylor (VF2) and J. M. Stearns
(WE3) at JSC. The IntegrationContractor contacts are
R. Ramon at (310)922-3679 or C. I.Miyashiro at(310)922-0214.
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